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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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The federal government is becoming increasingly “corporate” and, consequently, 
business-like operations are now more prevalent than ever. Part of the mandate to “act like a 
business” is a need to develop strategic plans and goals, which require metrics to quantify what 
is to be attained. In this environment, an effective performance-management program is 
essential to success. 
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The ASN (RD&A) has updated its strategic plan in support of the DoD’s efforts to 
transform the military based on these environmental changes. Its efforts to implement a revised 
performance-management program in support of its revised plan offer potential insights into 
performance measurement in defense acquisitions. 
Introduction 
The federal government is becoming increasingly “corporate” with ever more focus on 
issues such as competitive sourcing (A-76), President’s Management Agenda (PMA), OMB 300, 
the Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART), the Government Performance and Results 
Act (GPRA), and Management Initiative Decision (MID) 901, to name a few. And, with its focus 
on transformation under the Bush Administration, the Department of Defense (DoD) is part of 
that trend. Under Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the DoD has reorganized to become more like a 
business, with management teams, a top-down strategy, and a focus on performance-based 
management. Consequently, business-like operations are becoming more prevalent in the 
Department, and the DoD (like other agencies) is incorporating to a greater degree 
management artifacts like cost analysis, cost accounting, trade-off analysis, and performance 
measurement into daily operations. As the Government Accountability Office (GAO) states in its 
report on performance budgeting: “Performance language and tools have become part of the 
culture of governance” (GAO, 2005, 22).  
Part of the mandate to “act like a business” includes a need to develop strategic plans, 
as well as objective goals around those plans. The goals, then, require metrics to quantify what 
is to be attained, followed by processes to track and report on progress against those goals. 
With its transformation, the DoD, like many organizations, needs to make difficult management 
decisions—trade-offs among several worthwhile projects—and it requires strong, meaningful, 
verifiable information to do so. That kind of information comes only from a good performance-
metrics program. 
In support of the DoD’s decision to transform the military, and understanding the highly 
dynamic acquisition environment, John J. Young, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN (RD&A)) recognized the need to revise and 
update the Naval Research and Acquisition Team 1999–2004 Strategic Plan. Mr. Young 
identified two key needs within the community that the updated plan had to address: (1) to 
develop systems flexible enough to respond to the many different challenges the organization 
could face; and, (2) to create an organization that could reinvent itself on an ongoing basis, not 
only in response to specific threats. 
Mr. Young’s revised plan, the Blueprint for the Future, starts with a vision statement: 
Build a strategic capability to strike anyone, anywhere, anytime. 
The vision statement is supported by three vision concepts: 
1. Strategic Interests: must think globally 
2. Strategic Awareness: must be able to collect, analyze, and communicate 
information 
3. Strategic Resilience: must be resilient/innovative 
Figure 1 illustrates ASN (RD&A)’s vision concepts.
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The vision, in turn, is supported by three principles, under which Mr. Young outlines 
high-level organizational goals and initiatives/projects for fulfilling the strategic plan: 
Principle Number 1: The Naval Acquisition Team must think like a business and 
run a tight ship. 
Specific Goals: We will work with industry on a business-to-business basis 
and measure our organic businesses against the best industry benchmarks. 
Sample Goals: 
• Every program will seek to continuously cut government and industry cost. 
• Each SYSCOM Commander, PEO, and PM should ensure that at least 5 lean 
events are held in each depot or industrial activity—government or industry. 
Initiatives/Projects: The Naval Acquisition Team will deliver to budgets and 
schedules we define. 
Sample Initiatives/Projects: 
• Deliver LPD-17, SSN-775, and the USS EISENHOWER to the Fleet. 
• Complete contracts for DDX lead ship construction, SHA(R), and MPF(F). 
Figure 1: ASN (RD&A)’s Pyramid of Strategic 
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Principle Number 2: The Naval Acquisition Team must innovate and collaborate 
to deliver effective, affordable weapons for Sailors and Marines. 
Specific Goals: We must change how we do business in both major and 
incremental ways to deliver resilient strategic capability at the lowest possible cost. 
Sample Goals: 
• Define the path to ForceNet by collaborating with both the operational and 
requirements communities and with our allies 
• Define Sea Basing concepts and work with the Army and Air Force to jointly 
enable these programs 
Initiatives/Projects: The Naval Acquisition team must use incentives and 
metrics to hold industry and ourselves accountable. 
Sample Initiatives/Projects: 
• Contracts are the key management tools for program managers, and DASNs, 
PMs, and PEOs should ensure that an appropriate profit/incentive strategy 
structure is included in all new contracts. 
• DASNs, PEOs and PMs will define realistic budgets and schedules to deliver 
appropriate capabilities and will be prepared to be held accountable to those 
plans. 
Principle Number 3: The Naval Acquisition Team will operate as a 
neighborhood to jointly integrate systems and develop people. 
Specific Goals: The Naval Acquisition Team must, as individuals, take 
responsibility for growth and enhancement of our neighborhood. 
Sample Goals: 
• Every person in the neighborhood should daily seek to change things to more 
effectively and efficiently deliver value for the warfighter and taxpayer. 
• Managers will ensure that our system rewards unselfish collaboration and 
innovation. 
Initiatives/Projects: We will create an Enterprise Culture and achieve 
Operational Excellence: $1 billion in real improvements. 
Sample Initiatives/Projects: 
• We need to think and act like a fleet-footed business—instead of a big 
bureaucracy that moves at glacial speed—if we are to realize our vision of strike 
anyone, anywhere, anytime. 
• We need to develop clear acquisition strategies and goals in a collaborative 
manner with our customers in the Navy and supply-chain partners in the Defense 
Industry. 
UPDATING ASN (RD&A)’S BSC 
Given the effectiveness of the BSC model within other like organizations, it is an optional 
model for ASN (RD&A)’s leaders (working under Mr. Young’s direction) to implement the 
Blueprint. The original four perspectives of the ASN (RD&A)’s BSC are still valid: 
1. Warfighter: How do customers see us? 
2. Internal Process: At what must we excel? 
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3. Growth & Learning: Do we continue to improve and create value? 
4. Financial: Do we provide the best capability for the warfighter? 
Figure 2 shows the ASN (RD&A)’s four BSC perspectives. 
As part of the initiative to update the organization’s BSC to support the Blueprint, ASN 
(RD&A) managers should review and update the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) with a focus on 
metrics management, keeping in mind the need for: 
• Baseline review: establishing processes necessary to determine current status, 
focusing on the basis for performance-data analysis. 
• Performance-data collection and analysis: placing greater emphasis on 
 activity-based cost 
 operational and support (O&S) cost accounting 
 economic trade-off analysis. 
• Performance measurement: incorporating metrics into BSC and the strategic plan. 
• Flexibility: incorporating change mechanisms to accommodate the new 
environment. 
• Community involvement: involving stakeholders inside and outside ASN (RD&A) to 
offer input and support. 
• Institutional commitment: obtain institutional commitment at all levels. 
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ASN (RD&A)’S BSC: INFLUENCING FACTORS 
As with most organizations, ASN (RD&A) does not work in a vacuum. It has many 
influencing factors to consider as it develops and implements its BSC model. 
Challenges 
ASN (RD&A) leaders face multiple challenges—some common to other organizations, 
some unique to their own—that could impede efforts to effectively implement its BSC: 
• Proliferation of agendas: Many agendas affect the organization—individual staff, 
the many areas of ASN (RD&A) itself, DoN, DoD, government-wide, Congressional, 
etc. 
• Changing control: An ASN (RD&A) BSC must meet current needs, but be flexible 
enough, and sensible enough, to succeed through regular control changes, such as 
Congressional and Presidential elections. 
• Unforeseen/uncontrolled “environmental” changes: The ASN (RD&A) is greatly 
affected by environmental issues over which it may have limited control, such as the 
changes brought on by the end of the Cold War or the events of 9/11/01. 
• Overlapping roles and responsibilities: Within the Navy, overlapping 
responsibilities in areas such as requirements and budgets impact ASN (RD&A)’s 
strategic plans and metrics management. 
• Changing focus: The short timeframe of civilian political appointees and military 
leadership can dilute institutional energy for some projects. 
• Stakeholder consensus: Lack of consensus by stakeholders on the selection of 
measures reported often scuttles an otherwise well-developed plan. 
• Data reliability: Any program that relies on data faces concerns about the reliability 
of the data, and ASN (RD&A)’s program must alleviate these concerns—both by 
ensuring it has the technical capability to collect and analyze the data, as well as by 
gaining stakeholder buy-in on the method of collection. 
• Data volume: Large quantities of data in ASN (RD&A) can limit their usefulness by 
making it difficult for decision makers to ascertain the most relevant information. 
Existing Performance-Management Initiatives 
At the same time, ASN (RD&A)’s BSC must integrate—or at least consider—many 
existing performance-measurement initiatives: 
• GPRA: The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires federally 
funded agencies develop and implement an accountability system based on 
performance measurement, including setting goals and objectives and measuring 
progress toward achieving them. 
• CFOA: The Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990 requires DoN to provide 
auditable financial statements that link performance measures and financial 
information. 
• PMA: The President’s Management Agenda (PMA) is a coordinated strategy to 
reform federal management and improve program performance. It targets five 
government-wide initiatives for every department and agency: Strategic Management 
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of Human Capital, Competitive Sourcing, Improved Financial Performance, 
Expanded e-Government, Budget and Performance Integration. 
• PART: PMA’s Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) is one of five cross-
cutting initiatives in the PMA. PART uses a set of questions, the answers to which 
are translated into a numeric score designed to assess program performance in four 
areas: Purpose, Strategic Planning, Program Management, and Program Results.  
• CM: PMA’s Common Measures section is also part of the PMA’s Budget and 
Performance integration. 
• SEC Metrics: SECDEF established the Senior Executive Committee to lead the 
revitalization process. The Deputy Secretary leads the SEC, which consists of the 
Service Secretaries and USD (AT&L). The SEC directed the formation of the DoD 
Metrics Working Group. The executive secretary of the SEC leads the working 
group, which consists of members from OSD/PA&E, P7R, AT&L, and 
representatives from each of the Services and the Joint Staff. The DoD Metrics 
Working Group’s task is to develop metrics strawmen with proposed measures for 
each of the DoD Risk Management Areas. 
• Management Initiative Decision (MID) 901: Establishes performance outcomes 
and tracks performance results for the DoD in consolidating the management goals 
in the PMA; also utilizes Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) performance goals 
under a balanced scorecard and designates the metrics SECDEF will use to track 
associated performance results. The SEC is coordinating with the services in 
building metrics and a strategic plan to a framework outlined in MID 901. 
• AT&L BSC: AT&L already had initiated development of a BSC to address its 
priorities in response to QDR.  
• SECNAV: SECNAV has implemented its own initiative to create effective 
performance measures within DoN. 
• ACAT Program Metrics: These metrics address program effectiveness for 
Acquisition Category I & II programs. 
• Acquisition Economics: Economic Order Quantity. 
• RDA Strategic Plan: Finally, of course, ASN (RD&A) had to address its own 
performance measures. 
Sources of Strategic Guidance 
In addition to its common and unique challenges and existing performance metrics, ASN 
(RD&A)’s efforts are further impacted by the abundance of strategic guidance—some of which 
is found in the same programs that outline performance metrics, and others that offer only 
strategic direction: 
• National Security Strategy 
• PMA 
• Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 
• Defense Planning Guidance 
• Naval Power 21 
• Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) 
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• Annual Defense Report 
• Department of the Navy Posture Statements 
• Department of the Navy Playbook 
These challenges, existing metrics, and strategic directions create sometimes 
inconsistent and/or overlapping needs, data needs that could overwhelm operations, and a lack-
of-context to ensure that different initiatives will be effective.  
Figure 3 shows the impacts on ASN (RD&A)’s strategic-planning effort. 
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IMPLEMENTING THE BLUEPRINT THROUGH A BSC MODEL 
One way to implement Mr. Young’s vision is through a balanced scorecard approach. 
The following information is relevant if this model is the chosen path. 
Issues to Address 
In order for DASNs, PEOs, and SYSCOM Commanders to effectively utilize Mr. Young’s 
vision using a BSC approach, they will need to address the following issues. 
• Focus metrics: Effective performance management efforts must expand beyond 
cost, schedule, and risk. If they do not, they run the risk of concentrating on activities 
that are not necessarily those most important to the support of the community’s 
strategic goals. 
• Think longer term: Part of Mr. Young’s strategy is to plan for a longer time horizon. 
• Orient metrics to outcomes: The metrics being used, and, therefore, the 
performance being measured, need to focus on outcomes—not activities. 
• Create a line-of-site: Each PEO, DASN, and SYSCOM Commander must have a 
scorecard to create a line-of-site throughout the organization that demonstrates how 
the work of each employee supports the organization’s overall goal. 
• Create accountability: Implementing metrics throughout the organization drives 
accountability. 
• Select SMART metrics: Metrics need to be SMART, as well as consistent, 
understood, accepted, and evaluated (at least on a quarterly basis). 
• Align metrics with DoN, DoD, and government-wide initiatives: Metrics need to 
demonstrate a relationship to the broader initiatives of the organizations of which 
ASN (RD&A) is a part. ASN (RD&A)’s performance-management program must 
support its own goals first-and-foremost, but the absence of alignment to outside 
performance metrics simply creates an additional layer of collection and analysis. 
Putting it Together: Start Large and Work Down to the Detail 
DoN Strategic Context 
The DoN provides a context for strategy and metrics development and implementation 
starting at the top and working down through the organization at ever-increasing levels of detail. 
Figure 4 depicts the Navy’s strategic context. 
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DoN Combined Metrics Effort 
The Navy’s vision includes a single coherent effort to develop performance metrics that 
address both long-range goals for current capabilities as well as for transformation. The vision 
calls for its units to proceed from a common Navy vision and strategy, and then to consolidate 
efforts to develop metrics that: 
1. make sense for the Navy 
2. are useful to decision-makers and managers 
3. are effective for managing performance and driving change 
















Figure 4: Navy’s Strategic Context 
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Span of Control 
In developing its performance measures from top to bottom, managers need to consider 
the timing and impact of each stratified level of performance measurement. Clearly, as spans of 
control decrease, impacts decrease. Yet, at the same time, effort needed to implement plans 
also decreases as spans of control decrease. Important points to remember in thinking about 
stratified performance measures are (a) the measures must work like a pyramid, each level 
supporting the level above it, and (b) the impacts of decisions will decrease as spans of control 





























Figure 5: Combined DoN Metrics 
PM Span of Control
PEO Span of Control
























*Time Required to evaluate implications
NOTE: Strategies guide activities at all levels
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ASN (RD&A) Integrated BSC 
With a full understanding of the government-wide initiatives, of DoD’s strategic plan, of 
DoN’s strategic plan, of the Navy’s vision, strategic context, and combined metrics effort, of the 
span of control issues, and (most  important) of their own strategic plan, ASN (RD&A) DASNs, 
PEOs, and SYSCOM Commanders can construct a performance measurement plan that 
integrates them with the program’s BSC. 







ASN (RD&A) Objectives 
 
PMA/PART LINK 




Define the path to ForceNet by 
collaborating with both the 
operational and requirements 






Think as a 
business 
Each DASN, PEO, and PM 
should seek to reduce the 
volume of acquisition documents 
by 50%, including only essential, 
relevant information. 
- Budget and 
performance integration 






Every DASN, PEO, and PM 
should create a notional 
personnel development plan that 
would identify candidates to 
assume leadership 
responsibilities at scheduled or 
future transition points. 
- Strategic management 
of human capital 
Weapon 
systems 
Run a tight ship Every program will seek to 
continuously cut government 
and industry cost. 
 




Implementing Performance Measurement Based on the BSC  
From here, ASN (RD&A) managers can determine the measures, targets and initiatives 
that will support their overall objectives. Completing these three determinations (measures, 
targets, and initiatives) will create a line-of-sight for all employees in the unit, provide a 
dashboard for understanding and reporting against progress, and align activities with overall 
strategic goals.  
Figure 7 and Figure 8 are sample performance matrices (one each for a DASN and a 
PEO) including key areas, measures, weights, and sample data. 
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Figure 7: Sample DASN Performance 
Key Area Measure * Weight  
(%)
4 3      Goal 2        
Prior Year
1 YTD YE
External Reports #Nunn-McCurdy breaches 7 0 0 1 >1 0 0
#Programs on DAES agenda 6 <3 <4 5 >5 3 3
Prog Cost % Annual growth 5 <0.4 <0.6 0.8 >1 0 0.5
# APB breaches 4 1 2 3 >3 0 0
Schedule # APB breaches 4 1 2 3 >3 0 0
Performance # APB breaches 4 <3 <4 4 >4 or KPP 2/KPP 3/1 KPP
Program Decision 
Meetings
% meetings delayed due to 
documentation 10 <3 3 4 >4 2 2
% meetings delayed due to 
unresolved issues 10 1 2 3 >3 2 3
Requirements % ORDs w/non- CAIV changes 2 <10 <15 18 >20 4 14
Ave days pending ORD app 2 <180 <210 285 >285 200 200
Ave days pending APB app 2 <100 <120 150 >150 160 115
PPBS % programs changed (excludes execution & taxes) 6 <25 <40 50 >50 0 20
% adverse issues favorably 
resolved 8 >50 >25 25 <25 100 30
Fleet Fleet visit frequency 7 >1.5 1 0.8 <.8 0.3 2.1
Congress % late congressionals 8 <2 <5 5 >5 2 4
OPNAV/SECNAV
Quality workforce % DAWIA qualified 4 >80 >70 60 <60 65 85
% meeting cont learning 
objective 4 >75 >50 20 <20 40 80
Motivated workforce % current performance plans & scheduled reviews 4 >95 >85 75 <75 75 100
Award-reward rate (%) 3 >15 >10 10 <10 12 20












































































































Key Area Measure * Weight  
(%)
4 3      Goal 2        
Prior Year
1 YTD YE
Contract Perf CPI 6 >0.95 >0.93 0.92 <.91 0.91 0.96
Prog Cost % Annual growth 7 <0.4 <0.6 0.8 >1 0 0.6
# APB breaches 2 1 2 3 >3 0 0
Affordability % Progs w/goals 4 >80 >70 60 <60 65 100
% Progs exceeding goals 6 >10 >5 5 <5 5 21
Schedule # APB breaches 3 1 2 3 >3 0 0
Performance # APB breaches 6 <3 <4 4 >4 or KPP 2/KPP 3/1 KPP
Risk Risk Index 6 >.9 >.8 0.8 <.75 0.81 0.91
Contracts Current CPAR to total applicable contracts (>$5M) 5 >90 >75 50 <50 65 100
Current IPAR to total applicable 
contracts 2 >75 >50 25 <25 30 80
Ave PALT days past 12 mos 5 <180 <200 270 >270 230 165
EVM % applicable contracts 5 >85 >60 50 <50 65 100
%Replan IBRs to replans 2 >75 >50 25 <25 60 80
% Current EVMS MOAs 2 >80 >70 10 <10 75 85
Requirements % ORDs w/non- CAIV changes 1 <10 <15 18 >20 4 14
Ave days pending ORD app 1 <180 <210 285 >285 200 200
Ave days pending APB app 1 <100 <120 150 >150 160 115
PPBS % programs changed (excludes execution & taxes) 1 <25 <40 50 >50 0 20
Fleet Miss Cap Rate 5 >90 90 85 <85 90 92
Fleet visit frequency 4 >1.5 1 0.8 <.8 0.3 2.1
OPNAV/SECNAV Establish Infrastructure plans/targets (%programs) 4 >75 >50 25 <25 35 80
Actual Infrastructure 
savings/target (%) 4 >90 >80 70 <70 90 95
Establish Human Sys Int 
plans/targets (% programs) 3 >75 >50 25 <25 35 80
Quality workforce % DAWIA qualified 4 >80 >70 60 <60 65 85
% meeting cont learning 
objective 4 >75 >50 20 <20 40 80
Motivated workforce % current performance plans & scheduled reviews 4 >95 >85 75 <75 75 100
Award-reward rate (%) 3 >15 >10 10 <10 12 20
Trend QTR 1 QTR 2 QTR 3 QTR 4
YTD
YE

























































































Figure 8: Sample PEO 
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CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS 
Several factors contribute to success in implementing a BSC to manage performance. 
• Engage leadership: Because performance management is a big commitment, it is 
absolutely necessary to ensure the involvement of leadership by engaging decision-
makers in determining what activities to measure, the goals for each measure, and 
methodology for measurement. It is essential, too, to maintain consistent and regular 
communications with leaders to ensure their continued support. 
• Analyze decision-maker needs: End-user involvement is critical to any process 
redesign—particularly for a performance-measurement system because the end-user is 
upper management. The metrics put in place must truly support decision-makers’ needs.   
• Establish an overall metric framework: A framework is needed to address the multiple 
metric requirements and organizations within a performance-management program, 
including issues such as:  
 alignment with higher-level initiatives 
 procedures, standards, regulations 
 funding 
 organizational buy-in 
• Appoint a metrics arbiter: A performance-management program creates several 
metrics, pulled from various sources, which also can be complicated and conflicting. A 
metrics arbiter can save the organization time and trouble by providing the last word in 
disagreements over metrics.  
• Establish coordinating structures: Again, given the number and potential complexity 
of metrics measurement, coordinating structures limit confusion and work by 
coordinating metrics collection and sharing information where possible. 
• Test: A measurement program is a big undertaking, and generally the processes are 
new. In order to ensure greatest opportunity for success, it is best to run a limited test of 
the roll-out framework (as well as a data call test), to evaluate results, improve the 
framework, then roll out the framework to the entire affected community. 
• Use appropriate technology: Performance measurement, when properly implemented, 
is often designed around an integrated database and web-based technologies. 
Information systems in most organizations contain incompatible hardware, software, 
data structures, and communication protocols, and these incompatibilities must be 
addressed. Additionally, security must be reviewed and addressed. Transitions to a new 
data system cannot be accomplished overnight, and the performance-measurement 
framework should be designed with this in mind. 
COMMON MISTAKES 
Organizations commonly make many mistakes in the implementation of performance-
management programs: 
• Metrics don’t relate to objectives/priorities: In some cases, objectives and priorities 
are assumed and found to be either wrong or out-of-date by the time the metrics 
program is implemented. In other cases, metrics simply are not well matched to the 
organization’s objectives. The danger in these two cases is that metrics become 
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irrelevant, and the program’s success is limited by a sense among those collecting 
statistics that the program is simply make-work.  
• Metric programs take too long to produce results:  The assessment and design 
phases of metrics programs frequently generate an abundance of new metrics without 
consideration of the time, complexity, and expense involved in their ultimate 
implementation; this lack of forethought can disconnect management expectation from 
the project’s capability to deliver. 
• Recycling old metrics: Performance-management programs often take advantage of 
existing metrics, which can be valuable. But, there are considerable risks to recycling 
this data: 
 Pre-existing metrics are often fragmented and do not form part of a cohesive whole. 
This is especially the case if the metrics were defined at a departmental, rather than 
an organizational, level. 
 Pre-existing metrics may be at the level of granularity, scope, or focus they were 
when they were first conceived, and, therefore, are ill-suited to the new requirement.  
 The decision to accept pre-existing metrics on a “temporary” basis until a 
comprehensive metrics system is implemented can lead to failure. Temporary 
solutions tend to become permanent solutions as investment dollars are spent on 
implementation. 
LESSONS LEARNED 
As with common mistakes, there are several lessons learned among organizations that 
have successfully implemented performance-management programs. 
• Leadership must be committed to strategy and performance-management program 
implementation and accountability. 
• Managers must communicate strategy in an easily understandable, logical structure and 
framework. 
• Organizations must manage performance with a deliberate process. 
• Alignment and visibility of all processes and activities are important. 
• Measurement is essential. 
• It is important to select a good strategic-planning and performance-management model 
and continue to use it. 
• Measurable outcomes are critical to success. 
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